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OIL AND GAS-EFFECT OF ENTIRETY CLAUSES ON
GRANTEES TAKING UNDER DEEDS SUBJECT TO LEASE
Often the owner of land places it under an oil lease, and
later conveys fee interests or mineral or royalty interests in segregated tracts from the leased area. When oil is subsequently produced on some, but not all of the leased area, problems may arise
as to the royalty rights of the lessor and the grantees. Specifically, is the right of each grantee to royalties modified by the fact
that his tract is part of a larger leased area? The problem will
be considered in the absence and in the presence of the contractual
device known as the entirety clause.1
Various types of conveyances may give rise to this problem:
conveyance of an interest in the fee; conveyance of an interest in
the minerals under the land; or conveyance of an interest in
royalties. Unless otherwise indicated, "conveyance" henceforth
in this note will refer to conveyance of interest in the minerals.
1 An entirety clause provides that if portions of the leased tract come
into separate ownerships, the royalties shall be paid to the separate
owners in the proportion that the acreage owned by each bears to the
entire acreage.
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The weight of authority holds that the grantee of a tract
from a parcel of land held under an oil lease is entitled to all the
royalties produced from his tract, and to none of the royalties
from any other tract covered by the lease. The rationale is that
the grantee bought only the royalties from one tract and his rights
are not affected by the fact that other tracts are under the same
oil lease. 2
The rule seems logical enough on its face, but sometimes it
produces quite harsh results. Consider the Oklahoma case of
Galt v. Metscher. 3 There it was held that the lessee had a right
to develop the land as a unit and the purchaser of the south 80
of a 160 acre tract had no interest in a well drilled on the north
80-even though the well was just four feet from the dividing
line. Probably much of the oil in which the owner of the south
80 was adjudged to have no interest was taken from underneath
his land.
It may be argued that such result is not inequitable, since
the grantee gambled that the well would be drilled on his tract,
in which case he would take all. A rule which imposes such an
all-or-nothing prospect upon a purchaser, however, serves to render an inherently speculative field even more speculative. Furthermore many courts have felt that an undue hardship is worked on
a grantee who can receive no compensation for oil taken from
underneath his land through a well on the same lease. 4

Of course a decision adopting this result may have the effect of mitigating the hardship in case of deeds executed subsequent to the decision, since the parties can adjust the price in
view of the decision. The element of increased speculativeness
would still be present, however.

Galt v. Metscher 5 said in effect that the parties could remedy
:! Cases holding the sans clause, grantee takes all from his tract and
only from his tract: Central Pipe Line Co. v. Hutson, 401 Ill. 447,
82 N.E.2d 624 (1948); Carlock v. Krug, 151 Kan. 407, 99 P.2d 858
(1940); Japhet v. McRae, 102 Tex. Cr. 310, 276 S.W. 669 (1925);
Galt v. Metscher, 103 Okla. 271. 229 Pac. 522 (1924); Kimbley v. Luckey,
72 Okla. 217, 179 Pac. 928 (1919); Osborn v. Ark. Territorial Oil &
Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912); Northwestern Ohio Natural
Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N.E. 494 (1903). Contra: Cook
v. Cook's Adm'r, 261 Ky. 501, 88 S.W.2d 27 (1935); Wettengel v.
Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 Atl. 934 (1894).
3103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1924).
4 Thomas Gilcrease Foundation v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co .. 266 S.W.2d
850 (Tex. 1954); Galt v. Metscher, 103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1924).
r. 103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522, 524 0924).
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the situation by contract. There are numerous devices, which,
while conceived to solve various problems of oil and gas production, have some bearing on the instant problem. These include
the joint or community lease, the lease pooling clause, separate
pooling agreements, and equitable pooling.6 This note, however,
is concerned solely with the device known as the entirety clause.
An entirety clause in an oil lease provides that if the leased
land passes into separate ownership, the premises shall nevertheless be developed as an entirety and all royalties accruing under the
lease shall be divided among the separate owners in the proportion that the land of each bears to the entire leased acreage. A
typical clause reads as follows :
If the leased premises shall hereafter be owned severally or in

separate tracts, the premises nevertheless shall be developed and
operated as one lease and all royalties accruing hereunder shall
be treated as an entirety and shall be divided among and paid
to such separate owners in the proportion that the acreage owned
by each such separate owner bears to the entire leased acreage.7

When mineral deeds which contain a provision making them
subject to lease are later executed, an entirety clause will usually
be enforced to result in pro rata sharing of the royalties by the
owners of interests in the separate tracts.8
Louisiana is the only state which has refused to enforce entirety clauses. In a 1936 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court
enforced such a clause ;9 but the following year, the same court,
without citing the previous case, refused enforcement.10 The
latter case dealt with a deed assigning the royalties instead of a
deed conveying the minerals, and the lease read "in proportions
according to the acreage and/or interest owned by each" instead
of the usual phrasing "in the proportion that the acreage owned
by each bears to the entire leased acreage." The real rationale
of the holding, however, was probably that the clause was inserted into the lease solely for the benefit of the lessee, who did
fl Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization (1954).
7 Id. at 186.
s Carter Oil Co. v. Crude Oil Co., 201 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1953);
Thomas Gilcrease Foundation v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 266 S.W.2d
850 (Tex. 1954); Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37
N.E.2d 760 (1941); Eason v. Rosamond, 173 Okla. 10, 46 P.2d 471
(1935); Schrader v. Gypsy Oil Co., 38 N.I\I. 124, 28 P.2d 885 (1933);
Gypsy Oil Co. v. Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 Pac. 864 (1924).
9 Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co.,
185 La. 751, 170 So. 785 (1936).
IO Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Carter, 187 La. 382, 175 So. 1 (1937).
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not assert that ignoring the entirety clause would increase his
obligations or diminish his rights.
The argument that entirety clauses are for the sole benefit
of the lessee is seriously weakened by the fact that far less drastic
provisions will protect the lessee just as fully. At least one present day lease contains a provision that if a certain number of
persons become interested in the royalty, the lessee shall not be
required to make payment until the interested persons have designated in writing some agent to receive payment for all ;11 or that
regardless of division of ownership, the lessee shall not be required to measure separately the production from any segregated
tract or to protect any segregated tract against inside drainage.12
One recent Oklahoma case may be thought to stand for rejection of entirety clauses, but actually the court only refused to
apply a clause to an unusual fact situation.13 The deed conveyed
the minerals in a specifically designated tract for the duration of
the existing lease. The court reasoned that the specific tract
designations, if accorded any meaning at all, would have to be
applicable to the lease period. The court distinguished this situation from the other Oklahoma cases enforcing entirety clauses14
by noting that in those cases the entirety clause could be applied
dul'ing the life of the lease, and the specific tract designation
thereafter.
The above case does raise a problem, however, in that it
seems to condition enforcement of the clause upon the provision
of the mineral deed. There is language in some cases to the effect that the clause so binds the lessor that he cannot make any
subsequent inconsistent disposal of the land or mineral rights.10
If strictly applied, such interpretation of the effect of the clause
would presumably render the clause binding even upon grantees
whose deeds do not contain any reference to a lease. Such rigid
application of the clause might seem unjust when there is only
one grantee, but might be necessary where there is more than
one grantee to avert complex problems of the respective rights
of grantees whose deeds are subject to lease, and those whose
11 Producers 88, revised 1943, as printed in Kulp, Cases on Oil & Gas
835, 842 (3d ed. 1947).
12 Ibid.
13 !skin v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 207 Okla. 615, 251 P.2d
1073 (1952).
H Eason v. Rosamond, 173 Okla. 10, 46 P.2d 471 (1935); Gypsy Oil
Co. v. Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 Pac. 864 (1924).
ir, Ibid.
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deeds are not subject to lease. Where there are only two grantees,
for example, refusal to enforce the clause in regard to one of
the grantees would nullify it as to the other, unless the lessor
could be forced to compensate the subject-to grantee for non-enforcement. Just how far jurisdictions which enforce entirety
clauses will allow the clauses to be modified by the terms of
mineral deeds is a question which awaits further judicial clarification.
An Illinois case has been cited as limiting the effect of entirety clauses by implying that the clauses would not be enforced
where proper ground for reformation of the mineral deed existed. 111
Actually the case does not greatly curtail the usefulness of the
clauses. The grantor and grantee signed a deed subject to a lease
with neither of them knowing that the lease contained an entirety clause. After oil was produced on the grantees' land, they
sought reformation of the deed on the ground of mutual mistake
of fact. The court denied reformation, stating that when parties
sign a deed which they know to be subject to a lease, the terms of
which they are consciously ignorant, they manifestly conclude
that those terms would not induce them to refrain from entering
into the agreement. This statement may be only dictum, since
one grantee's attorney had a copy of the lease before signing the
deed and the other grantee learned of the clause (and dismissed
it as unimportant) after signing but before oil production.17 Even
in the absence of these last two factors, however, the result is in
accord with Nebraska and general contract law.18 Thus parties
who sign deeds made subject to a lease cannot get reformation
later on the ground that they did not know of the presence of an
entirety clause in the lease.
Entirety clauses appear to be eminently enforceable in Nebraska. In a very recent case the Supreme Court of Nebraska
enforced a clause even though the tracts involved were non-contiguous and apparently not even in the same geological structure.w
While other courts have enforced entirety clauses covering noncontiguous tracts, 20 there appears to be no other case in which an
entirety clause was enforced on tracts not of the same geological
structure.
Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37 N.E.2d 760 (1941 ).
Id. at 766.
is Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Suydam, 69 Neb. 407, 95 N.W. 867
(1903); see 137 A.L.R. 900 (1941).
19 Rauner v. Jones, 159 Neb. 385. 67 N.W.2d 347 (1954).
20 Schrader v. Gypsy Oil Co., 38 N.III. 124, 28 P.2d 885, 888 (1933).
16

17
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The holding is quite logical in terms of the statements of
some of the cases that an entirety clause precludes a lessor from
making any subsequent inconsistent conveyance. If the clause is
viewed as a covenant running with the whole leased area, such
factors as structural differences become irrelevant. If the clause
is viewed in terms of its purpose, however, the wisdom of its application to tracts on different structures is· far less clear. The
divestiture of oil from beneath a tract without compensation to
the owner is the primary evil which entirety clauses seek to avert,
but it is an evil which cannot occur in regard to tracts on different geological structures. Indeed, enforcement in such situations produces the same type inequity which the clauses seek to
avert, in that it transfers royalties from the owner of an interest
in producing land to the owner of an interest in another tract
which could not have contributed to the production.
There are factors, however, which militate for the enforcement of the clauses even in such extreme situations. The owner
of an interest in a segregated tract can be seriously harmed in
ways other than by uncompensated drainage of his oil through
other wells on the leased area. Since the lessee may usually continue to hold the lease as long as he produces from the leased area,
the owner may never get oil production from his tract. Nor may
he get delay payments from the lessee, since delay payments are
excused by production anywhere within the leased area. These
inequities may be mitigated somewhat by implied covenants on
the part of the lessee to reasonably develop the entire leased area
once production has been obtained from any part of the area.
CONCLUSION

Enforcement of entirety clauses is desirable in precluding the
uncompensated taking of oil from an owner of a tract in a leased
area through drillings on other tracts in the area. It results in
alleviation of hardship upon the owner of mineral interests and
lessens the speculative element in the purchasing of such interests.
When the tracts to which the clause is sought to be enforced are
not on the same geological structure, however, the desirability of
enforcement is less clear. If the clause is enforced, the owner of
interests in a producing tract will be compelled to share royalties
with the owner whose tract did not contribute to the production.
If the clause is not enforced, a tract owner may be doomed to a
long period of non-development of his tract, with no compensation
for the delay. The equities favoring enforcement have apparently
met with the favor of the Nebraska Supreme Court, and that
court will enforce an entirety clause covering tracts not of the
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same structure. In Nebraska, as elsewhere, the extent, if any, to
which parties may alter the effect of the clause through subsequent provisions in deeds has not yet been decided.
Allan J. Garfinkle, '56

